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Regional trade agreements are more likely to produce negative effects on
nonmembers the larger and the more protected they are. Because Mercosur
countries are efficient producers of the most protected products in the world
–agricultural and agro-industrial products–, these countries suffer particularly
from other countries regional agreements. Finally, these costs are likely to increase
with the number of regional agreements in which they are not members. The
arguments and estimates presented in this paper support these assertions.
The next section illustrates the negative effects on Mercosur coming from
successive enlargements of the European Union (EU). After that, I discuss some
evidence on trade diversion from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAF-
TA). The picture is completed with references to findings reported in earlier
literature. Based on the analysis, I conclude with some final remarks on why if
Mercosur continues to remain in a protectionist labyrinth, member countries will
suffer increasing costs from loss of export opportunities through trade diversion
effects.
2. IMPACT OF SUCCESSIVE ENLARGEMENTS OF THE EU
Initially with the creation of the European Community (EC) and then with
its deepening and enlargement policies, Western Europe has been the region of
the world that has gone the furthest with regional trade strategies. These
enlargements include: (i) Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, (ii)
Greece in 1981, (iii) Spain and Portugal in 1986 and, (iv) Austria, Finland and
Sweden in 1995. In what follows, I review some of the literature showing the impact
of successive enlargements on trade diversion in agricultural trade when Greece,
Spain and Portugal joined the EC1. In addition, for the enlargement of Austria,
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Finland and Sweden, I offer several new examples of negative export effects on
Argentina and Brazil. I conclude that the upcoming enlargement of the EU to
Central and East European Countries (CEECs) is also likely to produce additional
trade diversion effects against the Mercosur countries.
a. Greece, Spain and Portugal
Goto (1997) analyzed the accession of these countries to see whether there
had been changing patterns of agricultural and manufactured trade flows before
and after enlargement. He found that in all three cases, there was an important
increase in regional agricultural trade but at best, minor changes in the patterns of
manufactured trade flows. He concluded that these differences should be attributed
to the EU´s common agricultural policies (CAP) of high protection to agricultural
and agro-based manufactures.
In the case of Greece for example, the EC9 share of agricultural imports from
this country in total agricultural imports increases from 0.63% before, to 1% after
enlargement. On the other hand, the EC9 share of Greece’s agricultural imports
increased steeply from 28% before enlargement, to 64% after. The same effects
occurred when Portugal and Spain joined the EC. For example, the share of these
countries´ imports from the EC10 increased from 17% to 28% before and after
enlargement respectively. The increased EC import shares from new partners were
not concentrated in a few products but extended over many agricultural sectors.
Who lost agricultural market shares in the EC and in the three acceding countries?
The answer is that nearly all other regions lost shares in both groups of countries
including Latin America (Goto, 1997).
b. Austria, Finland and Sweden
In January of 1995, these countries became formal members of the EU. The
statistics on growth rates of these countries´ imports from the EU and Argentina
before and after enlargement, shows striking differences. The extreme example is
Finland where between 1990 and 2000 agricultural imports from the EU grew by
147%, while those coming from Argentina declined by 41%. An alternative
hypothesis to explain these differences would point to loss of competitiveness in
Argentina and/or exchange rate overvaluation experienced by this country.
Nevertheless, differences in import growth occurred during a decade of significant
structural reforms that between 1990 and 2000 led to a near doubling of agricultural
exports. Therefore, the evidence strongly points in the direction of trade diversion
having cost Argentina loss of market shares.
There are several examples that illustrate quite clearly important losses of
market shares. The first example in Table 1 presents imports of apples by Sweden
from Argentina declining by 67% between 1991 and 2000, while imports from the
EU increased more than eleven times. This example is of particular interest as it
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illustrates the trade losses to non-members associated with countries´ accession
to the EU and adopting the very protectionist CAP´s trade policies for fruits2.
TABLE 1
SWEDEN’S  IMPORTS OF  APPLES  FROM  ARGENTINA  AND  THE  EU
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Eurostat.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate clear negative effects on Brazil’s exports following
the EU´s enlargement. The first two examples illustrate dramatic trade diversion
effects away from Brazil and towards the EU on Finland and Sweden’s imports of
horsemeat. For example in 1990, 80% of Finland’s imports came from Brazil but by
2000, this share had declined to only 7%. During these same years, the
corresponding share of the EU increased from 15% to 79%. In the case of Sweden’s
imports of frozen orange juice, Figure 3 shows that in 1990 Brazil’s share was 42%
but by 2000 it had declined to 16%. During these same years, the EU´s share went
from zero to 83%.
FIGURE 1
SHARE OF BRAZIL AND EU IN FINLAND’S  IMPORTS OF HORSE MEAT
Source: Nogues 2003.
2 Protection of fruits in the EU is granted mainly through specific tariffs that vary by
time of the year and import price.  This implies that fruits and vegetables in the EU are
protected by dozens of equivalent ad-valorem tariffs (WTO, 1999).
Apples (millions of dollars)
Year Argentina EU Total
1991 10.1 3.6 46.3
1992 14.5 1.9 56.2
1993 5.1 0.0 50.9
1994 2.8 0.0 46.9
1995 5.3 23.5 63.5
1996 3.9 29.8 72.6
1997 3.8 38.4 66.2
1998 3.0 37.7 60.7
1999 2.9 34.6 55.7
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FIGURE 2
SHARE OF BRAZIL AND EU IN SWEDEN'S IMPORTS OF HORSE MEAT
Source: Nogues 2003.
FIGURE 3
SHARE OF BRAZIL AND EU IN SWEDEN'S IMPORTS
OF FROZEN ORANGE JUICE
Source: Nogues 2003.
c. Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs)
The next step in the enlargement of the EU includes several CEECs and the
question is what will be the effects of this enlargement on Mercosur´s exports?
While some results have been offered in the literature, in my view this question
merits more analysis. One study concludes that this enlargement will have minor
negative effects on Latin American because, in most of its exports to the EU where
it has trade overlap with CEECs, the region has comparative advantage. More
specifically: “for 78% of Latin American agricultural exports to the EU, there is no
competitive threat from the CEEC countries” (IRELA, 1997).
There is an important reason why this issue merits further analysis. To a far
greater extent than Western Europe, the CEECs are agricultural economies that are
undergoing major economic transformations from planned to market-based
economies. One of these transformations includes an important reduction of
protection to manufacturing which is expected to result in less discrimination
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that the CEECs did not show comparative advantage in the 90s, that this situation
would continue to characterize the future. The experience of the Mercosur´s
countries during the 90s of rapidly expanding agricultural output and exports
following structural reforms suggest that exactly the same could happen in the
CEECs with negative effects on third countries.
3. NAFTA
NAFTA came into effect in January of 1994, and this is the date for the
analysis of trade diversion effects before and after its formation. Here I concentrate
attention on what happened to Argentina and Brazil’s exports to Mexico who
generally is known to be an uncompetitive agricultural producer. Looking at Ar-
gentina, the first thing to note is that between 1990 and 2001, Mexico’s agricultural
imports declined by 36.7% while its imports from Canada and the US increased by
216.2% and 169.7% respectively. These important differences point in the direction
of trade diversions effects against Argentina (Nogués 2003).
One case of loss is that of sunflower oil exports from Argentina to Mexico.
Table 2 presents Mexico’s imports from Argentina and the US for the years from
1991 to 2000. By 1995, rapidly increasing imports from Argentina came to an end
and thereafter declined from $ 82.4 million dollars, to only $3.6 millions dollars in
2000. The figures also show Mexico’s imports from the US increasing fast to more
than double the value registered in 1991.
TABLE 2
IMPORTS OF SUNFLOWER OIL BY MEXICO
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from IADB-INTAL.
Mexico’s entry into NAFTA was accompanied by a regional discussion on
how it should provide compensation in line with Article 44 of the Montevideo
Treaty. This treaty establishes that trade preferences given by any member to
other countries should be extended on an “unconditional” basis to all the other
Year Argentina US Total
1991 13,0 42,6 55,6
1992 9,0 58,7 67,7
1993 27,5 69,9 97,4
1994 78,2 55,5 133,7
1995 82,4 98,6 181,0
1996 80,0 59,4 139,5
1997 48,4 73,5 121,9
1998 13,9 97,4 111,3
1999 6,8 98,3 105,2
2000 3,6 78,9 82,6
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members. These discussions concluded with the 1994 signing of the “Protocolo
Interpretativo del Artículo 44 del Tratado de Montevideo 1980”. Argentina and
Mexico negotiated compensation for loss of sunflower oil exports that took the
form of a country specific import quota but the figures in Table 2 clearly indicate
that this compensation had no significant effects3.
Summing-up, NAFTA has clearly had trade diversion effects on the
Mercosur countries. These negative effects are likely to worsen in the next few
years as sensitive agricultural products have been given long phasing-in periods
for reaching regional free trade. One major example will be maize that Mexico has
protected for decades and is soon coming up for liberalization under the NAFTA
agreement (Cerro and Velez, 2000). When this occurs, Canada and the US will
export more maize but most likely, the Mercosur  countries will not.
4. OTHER EXAMPLES
I want to add one last comment on how even small integration agreements
damaged Mercosur´s exports. Gupta and Schiff (1997) studied one case of how
Argentina’s exports declined as a consequence of the formation of the Andean
Pact (AP). When this agreement was created in 1969, the member countries included
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Later in 1973, Venezuela joined and in
1976, Chile withdrew. As was the case with several other Latin American integration
schemes, during their early years, the AP was very protectionist (Nogués and
Quintanilla, 1993). More recently however, the member countries introduced
important liberalization policies and are working to achieve closer integration ties
(Devlin and Esteveadordal, 2001). Nevertheless, for a relatively important number
of agricultural products, protection remains very high and is implemented mainly
through a system of price bands4.
Gupta and Schiff (1997) analyzed the effects on Argentina’s cattle exports
to Peru during the early years of the AP and Table 3 summarize their results.
Following the signing of the AP, Argentina’s cattle exports to Peru declined
dramatically and was substituted by Colombia. These authors also document loss
of price premiums associated with negative trade diversion effects.
3 The reason is likely to be found in the fact that Mexico retained the administration of
the quota.
4 An idea of just how protectionist these price bands can be taken from Ecuador’s
schedule of commitments when it became a member of the WTO in 1995. This
country binded the following maximum ad-valorem equivalents: poultry meat: 85%,
skim milk powder: 72%, wheat: 45% sugar: 45%, etc. (Ecuador, 1995).
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TABLE 3
CATTLE EXPORTS OF ARGENTINA AND COLOMBIA
(Millions of dollars)
Source: Gupta and Schiff (1997).
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since the implementation of the Tratado de Asunción in 1991, Mercosur
has signed membership agreements with Bolivia and Chile. In the meantime, many
other countries have continued to form new agreements and/or expand others.
During the last ten years, the number of trade agreements notified to the WTO has
more than doubled in relation to the first four decades of GATT and this dynamic
trend, is not yet showing signs of deceleration. In addition to the enlargements of
the EU, we now have to factor in additional FTAs already signed by the US such
as with Chile and Singapore and, the announcements that it is seeking further
agreements associated with national security goals.
In much the same way as Mercosur had trade diversion effects on
nonmembers and benefited from improvements in terms of trade (Chang and Winters
2002), the rapid expansion of FTAs around the world, is now having negative
effects on the Mercosur countries. What is Mercosur’s response? While member
countries are in a serious crisis, their leaders have announced three goals: (i)
extension to South America, (ii) deepening and institutionalization and, (iii) the
creation of a common currency . As to the first goal, in spite of the political capital
invested by former President Cardoso, Mercosur has failed to convince Chile and
the Andean countries of the benefits of joining. As to the deepening and
institutionalization objectives, they appear like putting the cart in front of the
horses. Deepening and institutionalization are objectives that can only progress
as fast as the goal of trade liberalization advances. On this front, the current
Mercosur is full of NTBs many of which have to be attributed to the lack of
macroeconomic convergence (Berlinski, 2001). Finally, the goal of creating a common
regional currency among countries that have recently been battered by major
devaluations, is clearly unattainable for the next few years.
In my view, this agenda diverts the attention away from the fundamental
objective of opening markets for the region’s agricultural exports. Why is this
happening? One explanation is that Mercosur has been co-opted by the
protectionist interests in the region to the detriment of exports and growth.  Mercosur
is in a labyrinth and while its leaders continue to insist on working first inside the
Argentina Colombia
Period World Peru OtherLAC ROW World Peru Other LAC ROW
66-68 31.9 10.4 21.2 0.3 3.05 2.4 0.2 0.5
70-72 16.7 0.4 16.2 0.06 15.8 13.0 0.6 2.2
% Change -48% -96% -23% -79% 417% 444% 302% 328%
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agreement and then seeking regional pacts, the rest of the world is fast advancing
with regional policies that will continue to divert trade away from the member
countries and undermine export possibilities.
All this would not matter that much if the multilateral trading system was
advancing with further liberalization agreements. But this is not the case and
everything indicates that the Doha negotiations will fail to liberalize agricultural
protectionism. Mercosur leaders must awake to this reality and ask why they are
failing badly to open markets for their exports. If they don’t do this and act
accordingly, the member countries will find it increasingly difficult to export their
products.
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